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CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY RULE S(c)
OF THE GENERAL RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
The undersigned, counsel of record of Price
Waterhouse, certifies that the following listed parties
appeared in the court below:
1.

Ann B. Hopkins ;

2.

Price Waterhouse .

Price Waterhouse seeks reversal of the district
court's ruling that Price Waterhouse violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In the alternative, Price Waterhouse

seeks affirmance of the district court's ruling that plaintiff
is not entitled to relief other than attorneys'

fees.

Ann B. Hopkins seeks affirmance of the district
court's judgment as to liability but seeks to have its ruling
as to remedy vacated and remanded for the entry of further
relief .
These representations are made in order that the
judges of this Court, inter alia may evaluate possible
disqualification or recusal .

,/

Davidson Ir.
At 9 ney of Record
for Appellee-Cross Appellant
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Nos. 85-6052 and 6097
(consolidated)

ANN B. HOPKINS
Appellant - Cross Appellee,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE
Appellee - Cross Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

BRIEF ~OR APPELLEE - CROSS APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

May a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 be established where there is no finding (a) that
the defendant partnership intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff employee because of her sex in deferring her
admission to the pa~tnership, or (b) that any discrimination
that may have occurred (in the unconscious use of sex
stereotypes) had any causal effect on that decision.
2.

Are the district court's findings concerning the

existence and role of unconscious sex stereotyping in the

comments about plaintiff by unspecified partners clearly
erroneous?
RULE 8(b) STATEMENT
This case was tried in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia as Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, No. 84-3040.

A related case between these two

parties, brought under the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act, D.C. Code § 1-2501 e t ~ - , is pending in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia (Civil Division), styled
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 3469-84.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The gov erning statute in this case is Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C . §§ 2000e et
~

The provisions of this statute pertinent to this appeal

are included in the Appendix hereto.
REFERENCES TO PARTIES AND RULINGS
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia (Judge Gesell) entered a Memorandum and Order herein
on September 20, 1985.

The Memorandum appears at page 7 of the

Record Excerpts submitted to this Court by Appellant - Cross
Appellee (hereinafter RE).

The Order appears at RE 35.

decision is reported at 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985).
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The

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff was a Senior Manager with the partnership of
Price Waterhouse (the "firm").

In 1982, the partners of

plaintiff's local office, the Office of Government Services
("OGS"), proposed her for admission to the partnership in July
1983.il_/

The firm's Policy Board, however, decided to defer

for at least one year any final vote on whether to admit
plaintiff to the partnership, a decision also reached as to 19
male candidates that year.

The Policy Board's decision to

"hold" plaintiff's 1983 candidacy was primarily based on
complaints received during the admissions process concerning
plaintiff's interpersonal behavior.

These complaints were

l/

During t he annual admissions process, the partners in each
Price Water h ouse office propose conditates for partnership, and
every partner in the firm is invited to submit either a long or
short form appraisal on any candidate about whom he or she has
relevant information.
The long form is meant to be prepared
for candidates with whom the partner has had a "major direct
client or project relationship during the past 3 or so years."
The short form is to be used for commenting upon any other
candidates about whom the partner believes meaningful
information can be supplied.
The evaluations are reviewed in the first instance by the
members of the Admissions Committee of the Policy Board of the
firm, which manages the firm.
The members of the Admissions
Committee then further investigate the evaluations by way of
personal visits to the candidates' offices, and then meet to
decide upon recommendations as to whether each candidate should
be admitted, held, or rejected. The Committee reports its
recommendations in this regard to the full Policy Board, which
determines which candidates will appear on the partnership
b a 11 o t .
( See RE 8- 10 . )
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reported by most partners who submitted an evaluation on
plaintiff's candidacy .
In 1983, the partners of OGS decided not to repropose
plaintiff as a candidate for admission in July 1984.

This

decision was heavily influenced by the opposition of two OGS
partners who expressed substantial and continuing concerns
about plaintiff's interpersonal behavior and her management
style.

(RE 12 & 15-17.)

Both partners had expressed these

concerns in the long form evaluations they submitted in
response to the pla i ntiff ' s candidacy in 1982.

One of these

partners had since that time also developed reservations about
plaintiff's technical skills as a result of a review he had
conducted of a project plaintiff that managed.

(RE 15-17 . )

When plaintiff was informed of the 1983 decision by
the partners of OGS not to repropose her, she was also told
that she still had a slim chance of being proposed for
partnership in the future and that the firm wanted her to
remain in its employ .

Several partners encouraged her to

remain with the firm.

(RE 32.)

Plaintiff, however, chose to

terminate her employment contract and to resign to pursue
consulting engagements as an independent contractor.
A.

(RE 6-7.)

Plaintiff's Claims And The District Court's Ultimate
Findings.
The trial of this case involved claims of intentional

sex discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.

42 U.S.C.

4

§§ 2000e e t ~

The

plaintiff alleged (1) that the decision by the Policy Board to
hold her candidacy was motivated by consideration of her sex;
(2) that the decision by OGS partners not to repropose her
candidacy was a product of sex discrimination; and (3) that her
resignation was in fact a constructive discharge compelled by
the OGS decision not to repropose her candidacy.
The district court found that the Policy Board
decision to hold plaintiff's candidacy was influenced by
discrimination; that the subsequent OGS decision not to
repropose plaintiff was untainted by any discrimination; and
that the plaintiff had not established a constructive
discharge.

Price Waterhouse appeals herein the district

court's finding that the Policy Board decision was a product of
discrimination.

Plaintiff appeals the court's decision on her

constructive discharge claim.

Plaintiff does not appeal the

finding that the decision by the OGS partners not to repropose
her candidacy following the hold decision by the Policy Board
was untainted by sex discrimination.
B.

Review Of The District Court's Subsidiary Findings And The
Evidence Respecting The Decision By The Policy Board To
Hold Plaintiff's Candidacy.
As noted, the decision by the Policy Board to hold

plaintiff's candidacy was based upon complaints it received
du~ing the admissions process concerning her interpersonal
behavior.

During the course of her employment as a Senior

Manager, plaintiff repeatedly experienced significant

5

difficulties in her dealings with the professional staff
members whom she supervised.

The partners of OGS who proposed

plaintiff and supported her admission recognized this and were
concerned that plaintiff's interpersonal skills or operational
style would generate negative comments once plaintiff's
candidacy was submitted to the partners for comment in the
partner canvass.

This concern was reflective of a

long-standing view, frequently noted in plaintiff's performance
evaluations and annual counselling sessions, that her manner of
dealing with people had a tendency to generate substantial
ill-will and hostility . fl/
The concerns of the OGS partners about likely
~

criticisms regarding plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not

~/
The district court found that:
"[c]ontemporaneous records
of counseling sessions and evaluations conducted well before
the plaintiff was proposed for partnership indicate that
partners found her too assertive, overly critical of others,
impatient with her staff, and counselled her to soften her
image."
(RE 15.) The records of the counselling sessions and
performance evaluations to which the district court refers
contain observations (a) that plaintiff "understood that some
people believed that she was hard to work with;" (b) that she
"agreed that she should be careful with her language - not just
avoiding profanity, but also guarding against unprofessional
language and expressions;" (c) that she had a "tendency toward
direct confrontation of a problem or issue, often without
sufficient consideration of the personnel involved;" (d) that
"this approach.
[was] often perceived as a threat to less
secure individuals;" (e) that she [needed] to be patient with
superiors who [were] slower than she [was];" (f) that she was
"sometimes overly critical of people's work;" (g) that she was
"sometimes overly assertive [and] must be more tolerant of
others who [were] not as gifted;" and (h) that she needed a
"greater focus on staff development. 11
(Def. Exhs. 11, 13, 14 &
1 7. )
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trivial.

The partners were well aware that the Policy Board

took seriously any complaints about interpersonal behavior
submitted during the admissions process.

As the district court

found:
[O)ver the years the firm has consistently
placed a high premium on candidates' ability
to deal with subordinates and peers on an
interpersonal basis and to promote cordial
relations within a firm which is necessarily
dependent on team effort.
Not only are
candidates regularly held because of
concerns about their interpersonal skills
the Policy Board takes any evaluations
recommending denial of partnership or a
negative reaction on this basis very
seriously.
(RE 19.)

The court further found:

The interpersonal skills of prospective partners was
properly an important part of Price Waterhouse's
written partnership evaluation criteria.
Inability to
get along with staff or peers is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to admit a
candidate to partnership.
(RE 14.)
As it turned out, plaintiff's undisputedly deficient
interpersonal behavior provoked widespread opposition to her
candidacy for admission in 1983.

The partners reported to the

Policy Board that she alienated the staff members with whom she
worked, and was abrasive, overbearing, arrogant, self centered,
annoying and irritating.

(Def. Exh. 27.)

In light of the

extent of this concern, several members of the Policy Board
concluded that plaintiff should be informed that she would not

7

become a partner.
312-13 . )

(Connor Dep. 29-30, 43 & 72; Tr. 267-69 &

Other partners convinced them that she should be

"afford[ed] time to demonstrate that she has the personal and
leadership qualities required of a partner," and her candidacy
was placed on hold.

(Id.; Def. Exh. 37.)

Thus,

she remained

eligible for proposal by her local office the next year or
thereafter.
After extensive discovery and a four-and-one -half-day
trial, during which time the district court had an opportunity
to observe plaintiff and to hear her testimony and the
testimony of partners and staff professional s of the firm,

the

court held that the complaints about plaintiff's interpersona l
behavior upon which the Policy Board based its decision were
true and correct.

Indeed , the court expressly found that

''[p]laintiff 's conduct provided ample justification for the
complaints that formed the basis of the Policy Board's
decision" and that "plaintiff had considerable problems dealing
with staff and peers."

(RE 15 & 31) (emphasis added.)

The court further found that the Policy Board treated
plaintiff no differently than it treated male candidates whose
interpersona l skills were unacceptable .

(RE 17-21.)

The court

found that "the fir~ has consistently placed a high premium on
candidates' ability to deal with subordinates and peers," and
that the Policy Board "regularly held" candidates because of
concerns about their interpersona l skills.

8

( RE 19. )

Having found that the plaintiff was, among other
things, rude, insensitive, unduly harsh, and difficult to work
with, and that the Policy Board fairly took this into account
in exercising caution and holding her candidacy, the court
nevertheless proceeded to impose liability upon Price
Waterhouse under a novel theory .

Under this theory, the Policy

Board was not entitled to rely upon the comments criticizing
the plaintiff's interpersonal skills in determining whether she
should be admitted, even though the comments were "amply"
justified by her admittedly unacceptable behavior.

According

to the district court, Title VII imposed upon the Policy Board
the obligation to somehow discount criticisms of plaintiff
because they may have been influenced by a phenomenon the court
called "sex stereotyping."
The term as used by the court here does not connote
the kind of stereotyping with which courts have dealt
previously in Title VII cases.

In those other cases, employers

were held to have unlawfully stereotyped when they excluded
members of a protected group from consideration for positions
on the basis of a negative generalization that all members of
that group were unqualified .

For example, one employer

violated Title VII when it rejected a female employee's
application for a promotion to a police officer position on the
basis of a stereotyped assumption that females were not
physically capable of doing that work.

:

9

See Thorne v. City of

El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,

105

S. Ct. 380 (1984).
The form of stereotyping that the district court
found operative in this case does not involve the negative
stereotypes described above.

In fact,

the court's excursion

into the field of stereotyping began with positive stereotypes
of men and women.

In society in general, the theory goes,

there are different stereotyped expectations for the behavior
of men and women.

Men supposedly are expected to behave in a

combative, assertive and aggressive fashion,

and women are

expected to be tender, understanding and concerned.
When (again in society in general) a woman engages in
behavior which is under any test unacceptable but which also
runs counter to the stereotyped expectations for the behavior
of women, those holding such stereotypes might react more
harshly to the unacceptable behavior.

The tendency to so react

is supposedly heightened when the evaluator has only limited
contact with females and in particular with the female being
evaluated.
The court applied this theory to plaintiff's situation
as follows.

Plaintiff engaged in behavior that was

unacceptable for males or females, ~ ,

she was rude, overly

critical, impatient with staff, and unduly harsh.

As a female,

however, this offensive behavior also ran counter to that of
the stereotype for her group, the members of which are
supp0sedly expected by some members of society to be tender and

10

concerned.

Therefore, those with limited contact with her

( ~ , those who completed "short forms") may have somehow
unconsciously exaggerated or overreacted to the still
undisputedly unacceptable behavior.fl/
The evidence presented by plaintiff in support of the
theory the court adopted was limited to the testimony of
Dr . Susan Fiske, a social psychologist.~/

Although she

testified at length about the phenomenon of stereotyping in
general,

she could reach only a limited conclusion as to its

operation in plaintiff's particular situation.

As the court

noted,
Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able to
determine whether or not any particular
reaction was determined by the operation of

3/
Since the court found complaints about plaintiff's
Interpersonal skills to be well founded, the district court's
analysis of this "stereotyping" argument must have been solely
one of degree.
It was this supposed extra degree of intensity
allegedly prompted by an adverse reaction to plaintiff's
counter-stereotypi cal conduct coupled with the allegation that
the Policy Board should have recognized and addressed this risk
which plaintiff claimed formed the basis for a finding of
discrimination under Title VII.

1/

Plaintiff introduced this wholly new and different claim of
discrimination late in the trial, in what she characterized as
a rebuttal presentation.
This claim had not been disclosed in
discovery (Def. Exh. 76) and did not in any sense seek to rebut
or to demonstrate the pretexuality of the reasons offered by
Price Waterhouse to explain the Policy Board decision.
Indeed,
this last minute claim effectively conceded that the reasons
for the Policy Board's decision were not invented to hide an
intent to discriminate. Dr. Fiske's improper rebuttal
testimony was erroneously admitted over the objection of Price
Waterhouse.
(Tr. 539. ) See VI Wigmore on Evidence § 1873
(Chadbourne rev. 1976).
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sex stereotypes.
However, she did identify
comments that she believed were influenced
by sex stereotypes.
Dr. Fiske stated that
in her opinion unfavorable comments by male
partners, slanted in a negative direction by
operation of male stereotyping , were a major
factor in the firm's evaluation of the
plaintiff.
But she could not pinpoint the
degree to which stereotyping had influenced
the selection process.
( RE 23. )

Dr. Fiske therefore could not identify those who
overreacted to plaintiff's unacceptable behavior or the degree,
if any, to which such overreaction s affected the decision to
"hold."L:'2/

This was not surprising,

since plaintiff presented

no evidence concerning the individual negative short form

~/
Dr . Fiske's conclusions are further subject to question
because of the faulty assumptions upon which they are based.
For example , Dr. Fiske used the concept of "rarity" to advance
the notion that plaintiff was judged more harshly because she
was the only female candidate proposed that year.
By
necessity, however, the perceptions of the partners were based
upon her conduct as a Senior Manager, not as a partnership
candidate, and women are not rare in the Senior Manager ranks.
Dr. Fiske also relied on the fact that the negative comments
about plaintiff were "extreme," but she did not make a complete
review of all the admissions materials that were available to
her.
If she had, she would have found that comments that she
might consider extreme are common in the admissions process .
(Def. Exh. 68.)
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commentors or the conduct on the part of plaintiff to which
they had reacted, and Dr. Fiske made no effort to secure this
data .

Being admittedly unable to discern whether so much as

one single comment was in her professional opinion affected by
"male stereotyping,

11

Dr. Fiske nevertheless did not hesitate to

engage in "expert" speculation.
The court appeared to agree with Dr. Fiske's
uninformed and unfounded speculation that the stereotyping
phenomenon "played an undefined role in blocking plaintiff's
admission,

11

but did not identify with any degree of clarity the

"proof" upon which it based this conclusion.

( RE 2 5. )

It did

however cite the plaintiff's evidentiary theory as follows:
Plaintiff claims that this type of sexual
stereotyping is reflected in comments about her
aggressiveness and profanity that indicate she
was being evaluated as a woman and not simply as
a partnership candidate.
One commentor said "she
may have ov ercompensated for being a woman. 11
Another suggested that she needed to take a
"course at charm school."
( RE 21. )

In evaluating these claims the following

uncontradicted evidence is probative.
First , the court's reference to and reliance on
"comments about her aggressiveness and profanity" without
citation belies the fact that not one of her critics referred
to either in their written comments.

The subject of profanity

arose only when an Admissions Committee member noted a
reference to profanity in her personnel file and asked an OGS
partner about the reference.

(Tr. 321; Def. Exh. 30.)
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Neither

plaintiff nor Price Waterhouse contends that she was placed on
hold because of her use of profanity.
Second, the partner's comment that plaintiff may have
overcompensa ted for being a woman was made in the context of
the partner's explaining why he had changed his vote from
"hold" to "yes."

(Def. Exh. 31.)

He sought to excuse her

unacceptable behavior on the grounds that she might have been
concerned that she would be criticized if she were not
sufficiently aggressive.

Even if this indicated that plaintiff

was being evaluated as a woman, this factor worked to her favor
as it allowed the partner to excuse otherwise unacceptable
behavior.
Third, a critic's comment that plaintiff needed to
take a course at "charm school" is not sex indicative.

Charm

is considered a positive characterist ic for male and female
partnership ca~didates.
& 148.)

(Def. Exh . 68 at 49, 51, 98, 103, 147

Furthermore, the term "charm school" is commonly used

with respect to men or women to describe classes that teach
"manners."
The court also claimed that the comments of
plaintiff's supporters indicated that the complaints by her
critics were somehow more harshly stated because of
disappointed stereotyped expectations .

(RE 21.)

Of the

remarks by plaintiff's supporters cited by the court for this
proposition, only one even purports to address complaints by
plaintiff's critics .

Then too, it speculates about the

14

derivation of what turned out to be nonexistent complaints
about plaintiff's profanity.

(Def. Exh. 30.)

The other

supporters cited do not even mention plaintiff's critics.

(Id. )

Perhaps the most mischaracterized statement in the
court's decision was that by Mr. Beyer, plaintiff's strongest
supporter.

Mr. Beyer made the comment attributed to him but

the court was incorrect in stating that he was "responsible for
telling her what problems the Policy Board had identified with
her candidacy."

( RE 22. )

It was Mr. Connor, the firm's Senior

Partner, who took on this responsibility,

and he did not

mention to plaintiff any concerns about her femininity in their
discussion.

(Tr. 89-95.)

Mr. Beyer is not a member of the Policy Board, and
therefore his only information about the "hold" decision came
from Mr. Connor.

Mr . Connor explained to Mr. Beyer that

plaintiff wo~ld have to tone down her approach to people
because she had irritated a number of partners, whom Mr. Connor
did not identify.

(Tr. 213.)

No mention was made during this

conversation of plaintiff's style of dress or grooming.
(Tr.

168. )
Presumably as further support for its conclusion that

sex stereotyping played an undefined role in the admissions
process as to plaintiff, the court cited isolated comments
concerning female candidates in prior years.

(RE 22.)

these comments were made by partners who commented on
plaintiff's candidacy.

(Compare Def. Exh. 63 with Def.

15

None of

Exh. 27.)

Moreover there was no evidence adduced to provide a

foundation or context for interpreting some hidden motivation
for the remarks .

That is to say, neither the authors nor the

subjects of the remarks were called to testify.

Nevertheless,

the court felt free to read its interpretation of an
unconscious motive into the remarks.
In so doing, the court made no attempt to reconcile
its interpretations of these comments with the evidence before
it.

First, the court stated that "[t)o be identified as a

'women's lib [ b)er' was regarded as negative comment," (RE 22),
and suggested that the Policy Board was willing to credit and
rely upon the remark.

That candidate was admitted the first

time she was proposed.
Second,

(Def. Exh. 63, Tab 5.)

a partner was described by the court as

"repeatedly" commenting that he could not seriously consider
any woman as a partnership candidate, and the firm allegedly
took no action to discourage his comments and recorded his vote
in the overall summary .

The comment appeared only in the 1981

admissions cycle and was not repeated thereafter.
63, at Tabs 3 & 10.)

(Def. Exh.

Furthermore, his vote was not included in

the statistical summaries recording such recommendations.
(Id.)

The testimony concerning the firm's reactions to such

comments established that the comments were ignored.

While the

then current chairman of the Admissions Committee could not
recall whether the partner had been told to refrain from
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submitting such comments,
recurred after 1981.

(Tr. 280), the comments never

(Def. Exh. 63.)

Finally, the court noted that the Policy Board had
rejected two other women candidates because of concerns about
interpersonal skills.

(RE 23.)

The first candidate cited,

however, was not from a prior year,

as the court claimed.

was proposed the year after plaintiff's proposal.

She

(Def. Exh.

6 3 , at Tab 4 . )
The second candidate was indeed described as "Ma
Barker."

(Id. at Tab 10.)

The record shows that the candidate

was the victim of, if anything, cultural stereotyping.L§_/

That

is, she was characterized as a hick by a partner who was
concerned that her effectiveness as a partner would be limited
to the "oil patch" area surrounding Houston.

Similarly, the

record also shows that the "one of the boys" remark refers not
to masculine characteristics, but to her habit of choosing to
lunch and socialize with the clerical staff rather than the
professional staff.

(Id.; Connor Dep. at 84.)

While the court viewed the documents before it as
somehow supporting the conclusion that unconscious stereotyping

6/ Presumably the court would have considered a remark
comparing her to Al Capone to be not indicative that
stereotyping was at work.
The point is that it takes a great
leap of faith to accept without any foundation whatsoever that
the reference alone proves that partners held stereotyped
expectations and were reacting more harshly to this candidate's
behavior because it ran counter to the stereotype.
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had occurred, it specifically found that no partner who
commented negatively about plaintiff had engaged in intentional
discrimination.

(RE 25.)

Moreover, the court also found that

none of the members of the Policy Board had engaged in such
invidious discrimination.

( RE 28-29. )

The court instead found

Price Waterhouse liable under Title VII because its Policy
Board in deciding to defer ultimate disposition of plaintiff's
candidacy had received and reviewed negative comments possibly
made more intense as a result of disappointed stereotyped
expectations and did so under circumstances where it should
have recognized clear indications of this possibility.
26.)

(RE

The allegedly "clear indications" recounted, however,

were the same comments and statements discussed earlier, and
are therefore based on the same faulty assumptions and
disregard of the record before the court.
Thus, the court's decision in effect required the firm
to take affirmative steps to redress a problem that had not
been shown, much less proven, to exist.

Price Waterhouse

therefore submits that the court's decision must be reversed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Price Waterhouse submits in its appeal that the
district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that
plaintiff had satisfied her burden of proving unlawful sex
discrimination without proving intentional discrimination on
the part of any official of Price Waterhouse.
J

.:
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Furthermore, the

court erred in finding liability where the plaintiff failed to
prove that the "unconscious" alleged "discrimination" had any
causal impact on the "hold" decision challenged by plaintiff.
The court's decision is further challenged on the grounds that
there was no competent evidence to support the findings
underlying the liability determination.
In response to plaintiff's appeal in this proceeding
Price Waterhouse submits that even if the "hold" decision was
discriminatory, the plaintiff was not entitled to relief other
than that awarded by the court because she voluntarily resigned
her employment under circumstances that did not establish that
she was constructively discharged,

and because she failed to

prove up the amount of damages to which she might otherwise be
entitled for the period preceding her voluntary resignation.
ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Applied Novel And Unsupported Legal
Standards For Liability And Causation Contrary To
Established Title VII Precedent.
Plaintiff's theory in this case was one of disparate

treatment or intentional discrimination because of her sex.
(RE 30-31 n.16.)

The primary issue on this appeal is whether

the conduct found by district court violates Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination with respect to the terms of
conditions of employment "because of" an employee's sex.
U.S.C.

§

2000e-2(a).

or disparate treatment.

42

Under

well-settled case law, to establish such a Title VII violation
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the plaintiff has the burden of proving both intent and
causation.

Thus, plaintiff must prove that she was the subject

of "intentional'' discriminatory treatment based on her sex.
United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983);
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981).

In addition, the plaintiff must prove that such

intentional sex-based discrimination caused the adverse
employment decision in the sense that her sex was a determining
factor.

Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983); cf.

Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 597 (1985).
In this case the trial court made -- and could make -no such findings.

Thus, the court found that any prima facie

case made out by plaintiff had been rebutted by Price
Waterhouse, which established that there were legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the Policy Board's decision to
place plaintiff on hold in 1983.
reasons were not pretextual.

The court found that these

The court also found that Price

Waterhouse did not discriminate against plaintiff due to her
sex in the weight it gave to criticisms of plaintiff's
interpersonal skills relative to men whose skills were
criticized.

( RE 20. )

Finally, the court made no finding that any partner
submitted comments to the Policy Board that were influenced by
an intent to discriminate,
"impossible" to do so.

and indeed said that it was

(RE 25.)
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To the contrary the court

found that neither the comments nor Dr. Fiske's testimony about
them "prove[d) an intentional discriminatory motive or
purpose . "

(RE 25.)

Rather, the court characterized any sex

stereotyping as "unconscious."

(RE 25.)

As to the effect of

such sex stereotyping, moreover, the court was unable to find a
causal nexus between any unconscious overstatements on the part
of unidentified partners and the Policy Board's decision to
place plaintiff on "hold."

The court clearly stated that it

was unable to find that plaintiff "would have been elected to
the partne~ship if the Policy Board's decision had not been
tainted by sexually biased evaluations," in light of her
"considerable problems dealing with staff and peers.

11

(

RE 31. )

Given such findings, plaintiff could not have
prevailed under the established case law principles concerning
employment discrimination .

However, the trial court

nevertheless found a violation based on the possible existence
of unconscious overreactions based on stereotypes which had not
been shown to have made any difference in the Policy Board's
decision nor to have caused any adverse consequences.

Such a

result is wrong as a matter of law.
In concluding that plaintiff was excused from proving
that the existence of sexual stereotyping had any impact on the
decisions made, the court below cited problematic dictum in
this Court's per curiam decision in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d

'
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1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .fl/

However, the vitality of

Day v. Mathews has been undermined by subsequent case law, as
this Court noted when it declined to apply Day in
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983).L.§/

In Toney,

this Court distinguished between a case where the plaintiff has
proven unlawful discrimination in the very employment decision
in question (as in Day) and a case where the plaintiff has only
proven "generalized discrimination" or unlawful discrimination
in the unit or system but which "has not been specifically
attributed to the employment decision of which the plaintiff
complains" ( as in Toney) .

Id. at 1366-67.

In the latter-type

of case the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove both that
there was unlawful discrimination and that it caused the
adverse result of which the plaintiff complains; it is not the

11

Day v. Mathews involved an appeal of a judgment awarding
the plaintiff back pay from the date on which he was denied a
promotion, the trial court having found that plaintiff's
performance rating had been adversely affected by racial
discrimination . This Court reversed because the trial court
had not determined whether the plaintiff would have received
the promotion "but for" the discrimination.
530 F.2d at
1084-85.
In a gratuitous discussion for the trial court's
"guidance" on remand (but not necessary to the decision), the
opinion asserted that the employer had the burden of proving by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the plaintiff would not
have been promoted.
Id. at 1085-86. Unfortunately, the
Court's goal of clarifying the law has not been fulfilled, as
Day v. Mathews has led to confusion.
~ ' Milton v.
Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
~/ The trial court also cited Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d
109 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert . denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981), but
that decision merely held, in reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff on a claim of retaliation, that the employer had
satisfied the Day standard.
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employer's burden to prove that the result would have been the
same even if there had not been discrimination.
This case plainly falls on the Toney side of the
line.

The trial court found,

at most,

"generalized

discrimination" in the form of "unconscious" stereotyping in
the comments of unspecified partners, but did not find that the
Policy Board discriminated against plaintiff because she was a
woman in holding her for future consideration.

To impose upon

Price Waterhouse the burden of proving that this essentially
nonidentifiable "discrimination" did not affect its decision
would effectly reverse the burden of proof as to the existence
of both "discrimination" and causation.
The trial court ' s conclusion that there was a
violation also rested upon an erroneous legal premise
concerning the rele v a n ce of "tainted" or discriminatory
comments by unidentified people other than those who made the
decision in question , particularly where that decision was made
by a collegial body such as the Policy Board.

The court found

it sufficient that comments reflecting discriminatory
stereotypes may have "played a part" in the sense that they
were considered in some manner by the decisionmakers.

However,

a plaintiff cannot prove a violation by showing only that
someone who made a recommendation was biased; the plaintiff
must also prove that the decisionmaker shared that bias.
LaMontagne v. Convenience Prods.,
( 7th Ci r . 198 4 ) .

Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412

Moreover, when the decisionmaker is a
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~,

collegial body such as the Policy Board, a Title VII plaintiff
must prove that group's decision was adverse because "enough of
the members .

voted against plaintiff because of an intent

to discriminate."

Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith

College, 648 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981).

Here plaintiff did not and could not come close

to such a showing, and there was no evidence that the Policy
Board's decision was to any degree motivated by or based on her
sex.

The only evidence as to the Policy Board's motivation was

the _ unchallenged testimony of its members that plaintiff's sex
was in no way a factor in the Board's decision.
&

(Tr. 260, 262

313. )
Having no basis for not crediting that testimony, the

trial court adopted the novel theory that the Board's decision
was "tainted" because (1) some unspecified negative comments to
the Board about plaintiff reflected discriminatory
stereotyping;

(2) the Board considered and gave weight to all

negative comments; and (3) the Board had not taken steps to
discourage stereotyping or to alert the partners to the
possibility that their judgments may be biased in the level of
intensity with which negative characteristics were described
(even if not in the basic substance).

As we show in the next

section, the court's findings in this regard cannot stand.

But

even if they are accepted, there is no precedent for finding
liability on the basis of such "defects" in the system without
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proof that they in fact affected the decision bout which
plaintiff complains.~/
In sum, the district court's determination of
liability rests at bottom upon the unprecedented premise that a
Title VII violation based on discrimination in hiring,
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of an employee's sex can be made out by showing merely
that an evaluation process was maintained in a less-thanperfect manner which did not preclude consideration of comments
that may reflect or be expressed in stereotypical terms, even
though there was no evidence that the decision itself was in
fact.

Such a principle would carry Title VII far beyond its

intended scope and would have the courts dealing more with form
than with substance.

The legal premise of the decision below

was erroneous and unsound, and should be reversed.
B.

There Is No Competent Evidence To Support The District
Court's Finding That Unidentifiable Complaints Were
Affected By Disappointed Stereotyped Expectations.
Even if this Court were to determine that as a matter

of law the conduct found by the district court violates

~/ There is no dispute that the Policy Board treated plaintiff
exactly the same as male candidates even at a time when it was
not clear that consideration of employees for partnership was
subject to Title VII.
The only appellate decision at the time
had held to the contrary, affirming the dismissal of a Title
VII complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
It would be unfair to
impose liability on Price Waterhouse on the basis of a theory
that Title VII not only applies but requires more than equal
treatment.
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Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment or
intentional discrimination, the court's liability determination
should still be reversed since it rests upon factual findings
that are without any competent evidentiary support.

It is

established law in this Court that a liability determination of
a district court is "clearly erroneous" and must be reversed
where it is based upon factual findings that are "without
substantial evidentiary support."

Cuddy v . Carmen, 762 F.2d

119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 597 (1985); North
Central Airlines v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
Price Waterhouse submits in this regard that there is
no competent evidence in the record to support the district
court's finding that unidentifed partners may have more harshly
criticized plaintiff's offensive conduct which conduct the
district court found deserved criticism, because such offensive
conduct contrasted with their stereotyped expectations about
female behavior.

Moreover, even if this finding were credited,

there is no evidentiary basis to support the finding that the
undefined marginal difference in the intensity of those
partners' otherwise appropriate reactions that could be
attributed to disappointed stereotyped expectations actually
"played a role" in the decision of the Policy Board to hold
plaintiff's candidacy.

Price Waterhouse submits that any

rational and disciplined review of the record reveals these
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findings to be utterly without foundation and therefore they
cannot be sustained.
The analysis of the challenged findings under the
above standard of review must begin with those judicial
findings respecting complaints about plaintiff's interpersonal
behavior that are not disputed in this proceeding.
district court found,

First, the

after observing plaintiff and listening

to her testimony and the testimony of partners and staff from
Price Waterhouse, that plaintiff's conduct at the firm provided
"ample justification" for the complaints that she was overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient
with staff as well as insensitive with others.

This finding is

not challenged by the plaintiff in her appeal and is settled.
Next, the district court found that criticisms of
interpersonal skills or behavior such as those properly
directed at plaintiff had regularly been made about male
partnership candidates and regularly resulted in a "hold" or
"no admission" disposition of those candidacies.

The court

further found that the criticisms made of plaintiff's behavior
had been weighed and considered by the Policy Board no
differently than such criticisms had been considered and
weighed with male candidates.

These findings are not

challenged by plaintiff.
Following this, the district court held that it was
impossible to label any particular criticism of plaintiff's
interpersonal behavior as having been made more intense by the
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phenomenon of disappointed stereotyped expectations.

That is

to say, the district court found that plaintiff failed to prove
that even one specific criticism was somehow more harsh because
of disappointed stereotyped expectations.

This finding is not

challenged by plaintiff in this proceeding.
The unchallenged findings make clear this is not a
case where an employer is alleged to be intolerant of
aggressive or assertive behavior in females.

The findings by

the district court demonstrate that Price Waterhouse encouraged
assertive and aggressive behavior by males and females.
(Tr. 571 & 577.)

Conversely, the firm did not countenance

overly aggressive, ~ , rude, insensitive, and unduly harsh
behavior by males or females.

The issue here was whether the

complaints about such unacceptable behavior by plaintiff were
by some measure more intense than the complaints about this
same undesirable conduct in males.
Upon what then did the district court rely in
determining, as it did, that partners offering what the court
found to be amply justified complaints about plaintiff's
undesirable behavior reacted more harshly because they held
stereotyped expectations that were breached?

The court did not

rely on any of the usual evidentiary tools courts have employed
to ascertain disparate treatment.fl.QI

None of the negative

10/ Decisions under Title VII recognize three categories of
proof plaintiffs may employ to meet their burden of
(footnote continued)
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commentors were cal l ed as witnesses and cross-examined by
plaintiff.

Plaintiff did not offer deposition testimony by any

of these persons who supposedly overreacted to plaintiff's
objectionable behavior because their stereotype was traversed .
Similarly, plaintiff offered no evidence, documentary or
testimonial, to examine the particular experience or conduct
that precipitated any reaction or comment by any partner.
Price Waterhouse did call partners from different offices with
whom plaintiff had substantial contact and who offered serious
criticisms of her interpersonal skills during the admissions
process.

They explained the basis for their negative remarks

and were cross examined.

The court specifically found one

partner's comments to be free from any taint of discrimination
and did not find the other partner ' s comments affected by
discrimination.

( RE 16 . )

(footnote continued)
establishing disparate treatment . The first is "direct
evidence" of the alleged discriminating evaluators' announced
or admitted improper motive.
See, e.g., LaMontagne v. American
Convenience Prod. Inc . , 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984); Lee v.
Russell Cty. Bd . Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1982); Zebedeo
v . Martin E . Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394 (D . Conn. 1984).
Plaintiff did not offer this.
Another type of proof is
circumstantial proof in the nature of comparative evidence.
Plaintiff did not offer this . A final category of proof is
statistical proof.
This type of proof, unless compelling, will
generally not suffice to prove individual disparate treatment.
Here plaintiff's statistical proof was not credited by the
court .
(RE 20-21.)
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The district court instead relied upon the testimony
of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Susan Fiske, who testified that the
phenomenon of stereotyping exists in society and who provided
the court with a profile or a "stereotype" that would
supposedly allow the court to identify stereotyping suspects,
in the absence of competent proof.
Based on only a superficial review of long and short
form comments concerning plaintiff and some other candidates
and the application of her stereotyping filter, Dr. Fiske
concluded that stereotyping was present and was a major factor
in the firm's evaluation of plaintiff.

This was the sum and

substance of plaintiff's "rebuttal" case.

Dr. Fiske examined

benign, sex neutral evaluative comments in a vacuum and
concluded that they were overreactions based upon disappointed
stereotyped expectations.

She did so

-- without comparing the comments to three years'
worth of admissions materials in which men are
described in terms exactly the same as or similar to
those suspected by Dr. Fiske to be overreactions (in
some cases by the very partners who used such terms to
describe plaintiff);
despite the fact she had no information and
made no effort to obtain the same concerning those who
wrote these comments;
-- despite the fact she admittedly had no earthly
idea what offensive conduct by plaintiff had triggered
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the comments which the court held amply justified
(Tr . 597);@/ and
despite the fact that the science which she
claimed had determined the existence of this
phenomenon placed great importance on knowing the
specifics of the underlying conduct being evaluated.
(Tr. 538; RE 24 nn.10 & 12.)
Thus, Dr. Fiske's conclusions that partners' comments
concerning plaintiff's interpersonal skills resulted from
stereotyped notions of how women ought to behave were based
solely on how they expressed themselves in, in most cases, one
or two sentences on the long and short forms.

Although she

acknowledged that certain behaviors justify such comments
regardless of the sex of those engaging in such behavior, she
had no idea whether plaintiff's conduct or interactions with
these partners provided such justification in these
circumstances .

Price Waterhouse submits therefore that

Dr. Fiske's testimony in this case is tantamount, in an
evidentiary sense, to testimony by an individual who purports
to be able to analyze an individual's handwriting and reach
conclusions about that individual's personality, without
meeting the individual personally or even learning anything

l.!_/

Indeed, Dr . Fiske had not even met the plaintiff before
she reached her conclusions concerning the presence of
stereotyping in plaintiff's evaluations.
(Tr. 569 . )

..
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about the individual.

Surely this does not suffice to carry

the plaintiff's burden and is not "substantial evidence."
In so arguing, Price Waterhouse does not mean to
denigrate Dr. Fiske's field of expertise.

It merely submits

that she did not have at her disposal sufficient information to
reach any informed conclusion about the role of stereotyping in
the admissions process at Price Waterhouse.

Her testimony

therefore was sheer speculation, and of no evidentiary
value.ill/
The court's decision does not clearly indicate the
extent to which it relies upon Dr. Fiske's testimony.

The

court did hold quite specifically that neither it nor Dr. Fiske
could determine whether any particular reaction to plaintiff's
behavior was affected by stereotyping or the degree to which
the phenomenon affected the decision to "hold'' plaintiff.

The

court, however, did appear to rely upon Dr. Fiske's profile of

12/ The fact that Dr. Fiske's opinion is not based on data
reasonably relied upon in her field renders her testimony of
little, if any, probative value.
In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See
also Merit Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (an expert's conclusions based upon speculative or
unfounded facts is of no evidentiary value.) A review of the
published research in the area of sex stereotyped evaluations
cited by the district court reveals the nature and type of data
which experts in the field usually rely upon in reaching
conclusions.
See, e.g., Wiley & Eskilson, Coping in the
Corporation, Sex Role Constraints, 12 J. App. Soc. Psych. 2, 3,
9 (1982).
Of central importance is knowing the specific nature
of the conduct to which the possibly stereotyping evaluators
are responding. Here the plaintiff's expert expressed no
interest in and did not know anything about the conduct to
which she claimed some persons overreacted.
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a stereotyper when it suggested that the partners who commented
negatively about plaintiff's interpersonal behavior on the
basis of less than substantial contact, i.e., short form
commentors, may have been the stereotypers.

(RE 26 . )L.±l_/

In

reaching this abstract conclusion, the district court remained
clear that it could not identify any specific short form
commenter whose reaction was disproportionately harsh, much
less too harsh because of disappointed stereotyped
expectations./14/
In addition to the use of Dr. Fiske's profile, the
court engaged in its own speculation that the bare written
words of various comments about plaintiff somehow revealed that
certain unidentified comments were stated more harshly because
of disappointed stereotyped expectations.

A careful analysis

of the "evidence" cited by the court for this conclusion
reveals it to be merely the court's unsupported inferences

13/ The court suggested that it was this group that
stereotyped when it observed critically that "[t]he Policy
Board gave great weight to the negative views of individuals
(RE 26.) The
who had very little contact with plaintiff."
court never reconciled that remark with its finding that the
"negative comments of short form evaluators are often in sharp
contrast to the glowing reports of partners who have had
extensive contact" and that such comments often resulted in a
(RE 19.)
"no" or "hold" decision.
14/ As it turns out, the harshest
came from a long form completed by
substantial contact with plaintiff
specifically found by the district
(RE 16; Def. Exh.
discrimination.
challenged in this proceeding.

l.
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comments about plaintiff
Mr. Epelbaum, who had
and whose remarks were
court not to be tainted by
27.) That finding is not

concerning unexplored isolated written materials from the
admissions process.
The court first examined comments concerning plaintiff
specifically.

(RE 21-22 . )

The court observed that "[s]everal

of the negative comments allude to the plaintiff's sex . "
(RE 26.)

Any rational reading of the remarks reveals that that

observation is flatly incorrect.

(Def. Exh. 27.)

This

observation indicates the court's predilection to read improper
meanings or bases into perfectly neutral words.
The court then proceeded to cite several remarks,
almost all of which were made by plaintiff's supporters.
Despite the fact that plaintiff had ample opportunity to call
as witnesses those who wrote these comments, she only called
one -- Mr. Beyer.

Mr. Beyer's testimony, combined with that of

Mr . Connor and plaintiff, clearly show that he was not
responsible for telling plaintiff what problems the Policy
Board had identified with her candidacy.

He had no personal

knowledge (or even complete second-hand knowledge) of the
complaints received by the Policy Board.

It was Mr. Connor who

had taken on the task of explaining to plaintiff the basis for
the Policy Board's decision, and it is undisputed that he made
no comments that even suggested that she had been held instead
of admitted because of her sex.
Thus, Mr. Beyer's advice to plaintiff is not probative
of the Policy Board's reasons for ''holding" plaintiff's
candidacy.

Neither is it probative of the basis for the
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underlying comments supporting the Policy Board's
decision.ill/

The uncontradicted evidence is that Mr. Beyer

did not know the identities of those who had opposed
plaintiff's candidacy, and that he did not know the specifics
of any criticisms, much less the conduct on which such
criticisms were based.

Furthermore, even if he had known the

identities of the critics and their criticisms, there was no
evidence that he based his advice on these criticisms.

On the

record before the court, the most that could properly be
concluded is that Mr. Beyer himself (plaintiff's strongest
supporter) might have personally preferred that plaintiff
conduct herself more femininely just as he might have preferred
that a male candidate conduct himself more masculinely.
The other comments from plaintiff's supporters are no
more probative of the state of mind of her critics or the
Policy Board.

Furthermore, there was no foundation upon which

to base the conclusion that these partners intended by their
remarks to comment upon others' criticisms.

Plaintiff called

none of them as witnesses, and indeed never asked Mr. Coffey,
who was called as a witness by Price Waterhouse, about his
statement cited by the court.

Indeed, Mr. Coffey's positive

15/ Plaintiff never claimed Mr. Beyer was communicating the
bases for the other partners' complaints.
(Plaintiff's own
testimony establishes Mr. Beyer did not know who the critics of
plaintiff were.)
(Tr. 82, 89.) Plaintiff received and
rejected Mr. Beyer's advice for what it was, his own personal
thoughts on how to put one's "best foot forward."
(Tr. 102-03 . )
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remark was not even before the court at the time of his
testimony since as the plaintiff's theory only came in later as
improper rebuttal.

Thus, there was no evidence that the

supporters who made these comments knew plaintiff's critics, or
the nature of or basis for their criticisms.

Without such

foundation, the court could at most conclude that her
supporters were expressing their own views.L.1.§./
The court, however, did not limit its speculation to
these matters .

The court also speculated that the Policy Board

should have recognized that unconscious stereotyping had played
a role in plaintiff's evaluations.

In order to reach this

conclusion, the court engaged in further selective
interpretation of isolated statements concerning female
candidates from previous admissions cycles.

Its exhaustive

review of the admissions materials revealed only three
"suspect" comments prior to plaintiff's candidacy.

The court

then proceeded to characterize these three statements as the
"regular fodder" of the process.

(RE 23.)

16/ Even if the statements of plaintiff's supporters were
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff's theory, they
establish only that these supporters were conscious of her
sex.
Assuming for sake of argument that this is improper, it
is elementary law that evidence of an improper motive on the
part of persons who did not make the decision being challenged
does not prove the improper motive of the alleged
discriminating officials. DeHorney v. Bank of America, 777
F . 2d 440 (9th Cir. 1985); Van Houdnos v. Evans, 39 FEP Cases
1639 (C . D. Ill. 1986).
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Again, the court imputed its own interpretation of
these comments to the Policy Board, but this time in the face
of direct evidence that the Policy Board did not so interpret
them.

the comment characterizing a candidate as a "women's

libber" was considered by the Policy Board to be "extreme."

In

any event, the Policy Board concluded that she should be
admitted.

(Def. Exh. 63, at Tab 5.)
As to the blatantly discriminatory comment by one

partner one year, there is no dispute that the comment was
completely ignored by the Policy Board.

This partner's vote

was not even recorded in the statistical summaries.
Furthermore, although the then current chairman of the
Admissions Committee could not recall if anyone from that
committee discouraged this partner from making such comments in
the future, he made no such comments in the 1982, 1983 or 1984
admissions cycles.

Such comments were therefore of no further

concern to the Policy Board by the time that plaintiff was
proposed.
Finally, the record before the court established that
the candidate described as "Ma Barker" and "one of the boys"
was not the victim of sex discrimination.

The context of the

"Ma Barker" comment indicates that the commentor perceived that
the candidate would be effective only in the Houston "oil
patch" region because he thought of her as somewhat of a
"hick."

More importantly, the testimony of Mr. Ziegler

confirmed that the Policy Board so interpreted his comment.
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The reference to "one of the boys" in the Policy Board
memorandum did not criticize her for masculine conduct .

She

actually was criticized for lunching and socializing with the
support staff rather than the professional staff.
Despite the fact that the sum total of the court's
"evidence" of sex stereotyping is zero, the court concluded
that the Policy Board, in relying to some undefined extent upon
"tainted" comments in acting upon plaintiff's candidacy,
discriminated against plaintiff.

Such an approach is entirely

inconsistent with the concepts of burden of proof that have
been firmly established by the Supreme Court.

Plaintiff

maintains this burden throughout, and yet the court inferred
"evidence" of discrimination from bare words that had been
unexplored by plaintiff but established to be nondiscriminatory
by Price Waterhouse.

To automatically adopt the inferences

most favorable to plaintiff under such circumstances in effect
places the burden of proof upon Price Waterhouse to disprove
the presence of discrimination that plaintiff has not even
established through competent, probative proof with proper
evidentiary foundation.LU/

17/ In some respects, the decision in this case reads as
though the court had a "hunch" that one or more complaining
partners operated from a stereotype but had no evidence to
Accordingly, the court set forth a litany
establish the fact.
of nonprobative facts, misstatements of facts, and conjectures
which it then suggested could be added up to equal
discrimination. Hunches do not suffice or substitute for
See Andre v. Bendix Corp., 774 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
evidence.
1985) (reversing a finding of discrimination based on a "hunch"
without evidence).
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The dangers inherent in basing a finding of
discrimin ation upon such "evidence" are quite graphic in this
case.

In response to the proposal of plaintiff , the Policy

Board received~ large number of intensely negative comments
concernin g her interperso nal skills.

These comments according

to the court had "ample justificat ion."

Such comments were

viewed very seriously , and indeed the Policy Board regularly
placed candidate s on hold (and even rejected their candidaci es
totally) even in situations where the opposition was less
widesprea d and less intense.

Thus the Policy Board

realistic ally only had two choices -- "hold" or "no" -- and
chose the more favorable option that "afford[ed her] time to
demonstra te that she has the personal and leadership qualities
required of a partner."

(Def. Exh. 37.)

Under the court's

decision, however, the Policy Board engaged in sex
discrimin ation by not admitting her immediate ly, because
isolated hearsay comments by supporter s may have been meant to
indicate that sex stereotyp ing played some undefined role in
the evaluatio ns completed by her critics.
Price Waterhous e submits that the district court's
decision ignores basis tenets of the rules of evidence and
subverts Title VII to a use to which it was not intended.
district court's decision therefore must be reversed.
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The

ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL
Plaintiff contends on her appeal that the trial court
abused its broad remedial discretion by denying equitable
relief.

Plaintiff's appeal proceeds on the assumption that a

plaintiff who establishes a violation is automatically entitled
to "full relief.

11

(Pl. Br. 11, 14-15.)

This Court has made

clear however, that the questions of violation and relief are
"conceptually distinct," and that it may be perfectly proper
for a plaintiff who prevails to receive no relief other than
the adjudication that violation occurred and attorney fees.
~ , Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, moreover, plaintiff avers that there

have already been other "significant" benefits from the ruling
below (e.g., "the damage to reputation that may accompany
denial of partnership has been repaired" (Pl. Br. 15)).
Plaintiff, however, seeks more, claiming that the
district court should have either ordered Price Waterhouse to
admit her as a partner (Pl. Br. 14), or in lieu of such relief
should have required Price Waterhouse to pay her "front pay"
premised on what she would have earned as partner for some
indefinite period into the future,

(id. at 19-20).Ll.§_/

18/ Plaintiff's statement of the issue presented addresses
only "equitable relief" and not back pay.
(Pl. Br. 1.)
Although plaintiff argues that the district court erred in
(footnote continued on next page)
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In challenging the trial court's denial of such
relief, plaintiff struggles to overcome the fact that she
voluntarily terminated her employment contract with Price
Waterhouse (Def. Exh. 53), by urging special treatment for
employees in certain professional fields.

However, her attempt

to create an unprecedente d exception to the governing legal
principles is not only legally and factually unfounded, but
unwise as a matter of policy.

(footnote continued from previous page)
denying back pay, she evidently seeks a remand on this issue
(Pl. Br.
only if there is a remand as to equitable relief.
a court
absent
that,
is
answer
short
the
event,
any
In
20-21.)
trial,
bifurcated
a
for
stipulation
a
of
approval
or
order
plaintiff proceeded at her risk in not offering evidence of
damages. Under Rule 29, Fed. R. Civ. P., while the parties
have some latitude to make stipulations concerning discovery,
stipulations that may delay the ultimate dispositio n(~,
extensions of time for discovery responses) must be approved by
Rule 42 authorizes separate trials as to any
the court.
separate issue, but only upon "order" of the court. A party
who wants a separate trial of an issue must make a clear
request to the court by presenting a motion or stipulation and
obtain a clear ruling; a vague statement in a transmittal
document not clearly brought to the busy trial judge's
attention does not suffice. A party who does not "go forward
on issues that were properly in the case does so at its
peril." U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 195,
209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Plaintiff's reliance (Pl. Br. 20-21)
upon Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social
Services, 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984), and Dougherty v.
Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1985), appeal pending, Nos.
In Caviale the trial court had
85-5715 et al., is misplaced.
found the defendant employer not liable and hence had not
reached the issue of relief, while in Dougherty the plaintiffs
appear to have addressed relief at trial, but the record did
not permit the court to make the calculations needed "to
compute the exact amount of damages owed" under the particular
Id. at 1290.
approach to back pay adopted by the court.
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The only violation found by the trial court concerned
the Policy Board's decision that plaintiff should be held
rather than made a partner in 1983.

Even after the OGS

partners decided not to repropose plaintiff for partnership
consideration in the next round, plaintiff's situation was
equivalent to that of any employee who sought but did not get a
promotion.

If having reason to believe that the failure to be

elevated was tainted by impermissible considerations, such an
employee is entitled to file a charge with EEOC, to participate
in the voluntary conciliation efforts EEOC is obliged to make,
and, if those are unsuccessful, to sue the employer.
§

2000e-5.

42 U.S.C.

The law protects the employee from any retaliation

by the employer for having filed a charge, sued, or taken other
actions to assert rights under the act.
§

42 U.S.C.

2000e-3(a).m/
The law also requires an aggrieved employee to

mitigate damages.

42 U.S.C.

§

2000e-5(g).

Where the employee

is terminated, this means that the employee must seek and
accept comparable employment elsewhere or accept an offer of
reinstatement by the employer to a comparable position.

~,

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); cf. Real v.
Continental Group,

Inc., 39 FEP Cases 1530 (N.D. Cal.

19/ Plaintiff declined to press any claim of retaliation in
this case (Tr. 139).
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1986)./20/

Where the employee's job is abolished(~, in a

reduction in force or plant closing), the employee has the
obligation to seek out comparable employment inside the company
or elsewhere.

~ , Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909

(4th Cir. 1983).

Where the employee is denied advancement, the

duty to mitigate requires that the employee accept the
employer's offer to stay in the same job.

~ , Alicea

Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119-20 (1st Cir.
1977).

An employee who voluntarily resigns cannot claim the

benefits of continued employment, nor claim damages or other
relief for the period after resignation.

~ , Clark v. Marsh,

665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent these limitations on
relief, arguing that she should be treated as if she had been
involuntarily terminated.

The only recognized principle under

which plaintiff might make such a claim is the doctrine of
"constructive discharge," most fully discussed by this Court in
Clark v. Marsh, supra, 665 F.2d at 1172-76, upon which the
district court relied.

( RE 32. )

20/ In Real, under the analogous Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 e t ~ - , even though the
plaintiff had "willfully" been constructively discharged
through a series of demotions, denials of promotions, and
denial of relocation benefits, the court held that his failure
to accept an offer of reinstatement to a position equivalent to
his last position cut off the accrual of damages and barred
reinstatement or front pay.
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Under that doctrine, however, an employee confronted
with a discriminatory decision is not entitled, merely because
discrimination has occurred, to resign and claim to have been
terminated involuntarily.

As this Court observed in Clark, the

case law indicates "a general reluctance to predicate a finding
of constructive discharge upon the fact of discrimination."
665 F.2d at 1173 (emphasis in original).m/

The Court added

that "the courts join in stating that a 'finding of
constructive discharge depends on "[whether the employer]
deliberately made.

. working conditions intolerable and

drove [the employee] into "an involuntary quit."'"

Id. /22/

21/ See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law 611-12 (1982) ("it is not enough to establish a
constructive discharge if the plaintiff simply establishes that
continued employment would have been under discriminatory
condi t i ons " ); id. at 7 9-80 ( Supp. 1984) ( " failure to promote,
in and of itself, does not establish constructive discharge").
22/ Plaintiff asserts that the district court misread Clark as
requiring "that the employer deliberately undertake to make the
employee quit."
(Pl. Br. 17. ) However, the di strict court did
not impose on plaintiff that requirement. Rather, the trial
court properly restated what this Court said in Clark, where it
found that the employer "deliberately made Clark's working
conditions intolerable and drove her into an 'involuntary
quit.'" 665 F.2d at 1176. While it is true that some cases
hold that the employee need not prove that it was the
employer's purpose or intent to force the employee to resign,
all agree that the employee must prove at least that the
employer deliberately or knowingly made working conditions
intolerable.
Id. at 1173 & n.5; Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun.
Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981);
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F . 2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.
1984); Bourgue v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., supra, 617 F.2d at 65;
Schlei & Grossman, supra.
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The rationale underlying this rule, and indeed the
entire concept of constructive discharge, was described in
Clark as follows:
"[s]ociety and the policies underlying Title VII will
be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful
discrimination is attacked within the context of
A Title VII
existing employment relationships." . .
plaintiff must, therefore, "mitigate damages by
remaining on the job" unless that job presents "such
an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee
would be forced to resign."
Id. at 1173 (quoting Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Applying Clark, the district court correctly observed
that "[t]he fact that discrimination has occurred does not, by
itself, provide the 'aggravating factors'
constructive discharge." (RE 32.)

required to prove a

The trial court specifically

found that "plaintiff has not shown any history of
discrimination, humiliation, or other aggravating factors that
would have compelled her to resign."

(Id.)

Rather, the court

found that her experience at the firm "was quite normal and
amicable;" the firm "had offered to retain her as an
employee;"~/ and some partners (including the
partner-in-charge of OGS) had "encouraged her to take this

23/ As Judge Gesell observed during trial, plaintiff had three
options available to her, two of which involved continued
employment by Price Waterhouse, i.e., rather than resign she
could stay as a manager without expectation of partnership or
stay as a manager with the then-remote possibility that she
(Tr. 138.)
would later be made a partner.
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option rather than resign when it appeared unlikely that she
could become a partner" (Id. )./24/

In sum, after hearing the

witnesse s the trial court found that, while not being made a
partner in 1983 "was undoubt edly a professi onal disappoi ntment,
and it may have been profess ionally advantag eous for plainti ff
to leave the firm," she had "fail[ed ] to show a constru ctive
discharg e.

11

(

RE 3 3 . ) ill/

Those fact findings cannot be set aside unless shown
by plainti ff to be "clearly erroneo us," and plainti ff has made
no serious attempt to do so.

Plainti ff's situatio n was not

remotely compara ble to that of the plainti ff in Clark.fl. §_/

The

24/ Plainti ff repeated ly notes that one partner who had
opposed her partners hip, Mr. Epelbaum , advised her that if he
(Pl. Br. 5, 12, 18.) Far
were in her shoes he would leave.
more signific ant was the encourag ement she received from
several partner s with greater seniorit y than Mr. Epelbaum to
(Tr. 112.)
stay.
25/ An employm ent decision perceive d as a blow "to one's pride
or prestige does not provide reason enough to resign during
whateve r period may be required to seek judicial or
adminis trative relief," unless it constitu tes a "drastic
reductio n in the quality of working conditio ns." Alicea Rosado
v. Garcia Santiago , supra, 562 F.2d at 119-20.
26/ Ms. Clark had been effectiv ely blocked from advancem ent
665 F.2d at 1174. Plainti ff's
with her employe r for 11 years.
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only action found to have been tainted -- the Policy Board's
decision to place plaintiff on hold

could not have compelled

or justified plaintiff's departure, for employees placed on
hold typically were made partners eventually.ill/

The most

that plaintiff can argue is that it was "reasonable" for
someone in her position to leave Price Waterhouse and pursue a
career elsewhere.

(Pl. Br. 18.)

Even if that were so, it does

not follow -- and plaintiff did not prove -- that resigning was
her only reasonable option, particularly if she still was

(footnote continued from previous page)
younger, recent law school graduate and presumably would not
become vacant for some time.
Id. at 1175. At Price
Waterhouse, however, there is no limit upon the number of
partners, and new partners are admitted every year. Finally,
plaintiff did not establish, or even allege, the embarrassment
and humiliation that Ms. Clark suffered. Ms. Clark had
substantial supervisory experience and had filled the position
to which she aspired on an acting basis for over six months,
having been the deputy for three years before that.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, she was demoted from the
acting position to her previous position as deputy and was
required thereafter to report to the successful candidate for
the position, who had no supervisory experience.
Id. at
1174-76.
27/ As plaintiff notes, 17 of the 19 other employees placed on
hold with her were reproposed for partnership, and 15 of the 17
were admitted.
(Pl. Br. 5.)
(The figures cited by plaintiff
for employees who were "rejected" by the Policy Board are of
little relevance because plaintiff was placed on hold, and was
never rejected.) Plaintiff cannot justify her departure by
invoking the subsequent decision of the OGS partners not to
repropose her the next year, for the trial court specifically
found that that decision was not discriminatory, (RE 17), a
determination plaintiff does not challenge on appeal.
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genuinely interested in becoming a partner at Price Waterhouse,
as she testified at trial./28/
Plaintiff evidently recognizes her inability to
challenge the trial court's determination that she was not
constructively discharged.

Thus, she now argues in this Court

that the constructive discharge doctrine "cannot be
meaningfully applied" and "is not germane .

. to career

making (or breaking) decisions, such as those involving
partnership or university tenure."

(Pl. Br. 11, 16.)@/

This

is a surprising position, because it was plaintiff who first
introduced the subject, after consulting with counsel (Def.
Exh. 53), by claiming in her amended EEOC charge and in her
court complaint(~~ 15, 19) that she had been subjected to
"constructive discharge."
In any event, plaintiff's attempt to carve out a
special rule for aspirants to partnership is without merit.

A

decision concerning partnership can of course help or hurt a

28/ Judge Gesell asked plaintiff at trial if she wanted to
leave her present job "and go back and join this crowd? That's
what you're asking me to do, right?" She answered:
"That's
correct."
(Tr. 118.) Of course, a negative answer would have
destroyed even a theoretical basis for seeking front pay in
lieu of reinstatement.
29/ This case involves admission as a member of an accounting
partnership, not employment as a university professor. Whether
any special rules are appropriate for up-or-out faculty tenure
decisions is a question not presented in this case.
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person's career./30/

But that is true of any number of

decisions concerning employees in other situations:

military

or corporate officerships or other coveted organizational
positions with few comparable alternatives(~, director of
research); membership in the federal government's Senior
Executive Service; and elevation within the career foreign
service.

Partnership in a firm such as Price Waterhouse is

simply not so fundamentally different from other situations
that disappointed aspirants should be freed of the same
obligations and limitations that the law imposes on all other
employees who are disappointed by their failure to be advanced
as soon as they would like . fill

30/ Whatever may once have been the case, with the increase in
professional mobility it is no longer valid to regard decisions
about partnership as necessarily "career making (or
breaking)." It is now commonplace for those who become
partners in a firm to leave and pursue their careers elsewhere,
and it is also commonplace for persons denied partnership at
one firm, if they leave, to become partners elsewhere or obtain
other positions and to have flourishing careers.
31/ Plaintiff attempts to analogize her position to that of a
black applicant for a high-paying actuarial position who was
offered only a low-paying, low-potential job as a bookkeeper.
(Pl. Br. 16.) However, plaintiff had the opportunity to
continue--and did so-- in an important job which was not
beneath her qualifications or experience. A more apt
comparison might be between plaintiff, who as an employee was
entitled under Title VII to nondiscriminatory consideration for
partnership as a "term, condition or privilege of plaintiff's
employment"
(Complaint, 16), and a non-employee applicant for
lateral admission as a partner, who could claim no such rights
under Title VII.
See Hishon v . King & Spalding, 469 U. S . 69
(1984).
Plaintiff~Title VII claim is necessarily premised on
her status as an employee of Price Waterhouse , and her
voluntary severance of that relationship terminated the only
basis for application of Title VII.
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The facts of this case, moreover, provide a
particularly uncompelling record for justifying special
treatment or a new ad hoc rule for disappointed aspirants to
partnership.

While it has often been the case that

partnerships follow an up-or-out policy, so that denial of
partnership is tantamount to involuntary termination of
employrnent,m/ that was indisputably not the case at Price
Waterhouse.

Moreover, unlike the failure of an employee to be

promoted to a position where the person selected would be
expected to have a long incumbency, leaving no comparable
opportunities in the "short term" about which plaintiff
expresses concern,

(Pl. Br. 16), Price Waterhouse has no

arbitrary limits on the number of partners.

Thus, the decision

to hold plaintiff in 1983 did not mean that there would be any
fewer partnership opportunities at Price Waterhouse in the
future.
At bottom, plaintiff's appeal rests on the assertion
that no purpose would be served by requiring her "to stay where
[she was] simply to pursue a Title VII claim."

(Pl. Br. 16.)

Again, plaintiff's argument is inconsistent with her prior
position, for her initial response to Price Waterhouse's
decisions concerning her partnership prospects was to stay
where she was and to pursue a Title VII claim:

she filed her

32/ See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 72
(1984); cf. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
252-53 (1980).
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charge of discriminatory denial of partnership in August 1983,
four months before she decided to resign.
Throughout this case plaintiff has professed that her
career goal was and is to become a Price Waterhouse partner.
(Tr. 118; Complaint 1 16; Plaintiff's Answers to
Interrogatories, Nos. 5 & 6; Def. Exh. 53; Pl. Br. 1, 18.)

If

that is so, then there was every reason for her to accept the
firm's invitation that she stay.

She had a substantial and

challenging job in an assignment expected to run at several
years.~/

Even without having filed a charge, in the ordinary

course she might have been made a partner in a later round of
elections; while this may have seemed a long-shot prospect in
1983, it was still a possibility that her resignation precluded
from having a chance of fruition.
By her decision to leave, plaintiff raised fundamental
questions about the bona £ides of her continuing interest in
pursuing a career at Price Waterhouse.

She effectively

extinguished any possibility that she would become a partner in

33/ At the time of her resignation, plaintiff had served for
approximately a year and a half as project manager of a $6
million engagement for the U.S. Department of State, with a
staff of as many as 19.
(Tr. 79.) Plaintiff had direct
dealings with clients both in the United States and abroad.
Indeed, despite the unsupported assertion in this Court that
the partner and Senior Manager positions were "qualitatively
different."
(Pl. Br. 16), there was no evidence that her
responsibilities as a new partner would have been any different
than they were at the time of her resignation.
She did not
present evidence or even suggest at trial that she would not
have continued on the REMS project even if she had become a
partner in July 1983.
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the firm, by removing herself from the pool of Senior Managers
eligible for proposal for admission.

Had she remained and

demonstrated a continuing commitment to the firm,

she might

have been able to change partners' perceptions of her
qualifications for partnership -- much as she was able to
change Mr . Coffey's perceptions .
If plaintiff had stayed, moreover, the fact that she
had filed a charge of discrimination might itself have enhanced
The firm might on its own have

her prospects for partnership .

reexamined her candidacy, with heightened sensitivity to the
issue of discrimination.

Such reconsideration might also have

occurred in the context of EEOC's efforts to seek a voluntary
conciliatory resolution.

S e e , ~ , Real v. Continental Group,

Inc., supra, 39 FEP Cases at 1539.
Thus, if she had chosen instead to stay, she might
have become a partner even before her lawsuit was resolved, and
she and the firm would have had the benefit of her continuous
employment with the firm and up-to-date knowledge of its work,
clients, procedures, and people.

Even if she became a partner

only after a reconsideration required by this litigation,/34/

34/ Since Price Waterhouse is a partnership , it is important
to note that reconsideration without discrimination would
appear to be the outer limit of the relief a court is
authorized to grant. Thus, Title VII applies only to the
"employment" relationship, which does not encompass the
42 U. S.C.
relationship among members of a partnership.
§§ 2000e(f), 2000e-2(a); Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra, 469
(footnote continued on next page)
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she and the firm would have benefited from this continuity, and
a back pay award would have made her whole.

Finally, if she

(footnote continued from previous page)
U.S. at 79. Where consideration for partnership is a term,
condition or privilege of employment, Title VII requires that a
partnership not discriminate in such consideration. But if
there has been discrimination, the proper remedy is
reconsideration without discrimination, not a court order
requiring that the plaintiff be made a partner. Cf. Pollard v.
Grimstead, 741 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1984) (even though
employer did not show that plaintiff denied right to compete
for promotion free of discrimination would not have received
promotion, plaintiff obtained "full redress" through
reconsideration for promotion without discrimination). The
question of the scope of permissible relief did not arise in
Hishon, because the plaintiff sought "damages 'in lieu of
reinstatement and promotion to partnership . '
This, of course,
negates any claim for specific performance of the contract
alleged."
Id. at 72.
The pertinent term of the "contract
alleged" was that the firm would "consider [plaintiff] on a
'fair and equal basis.'" Id. at 72.
We are aware of no employment discrimination case in which
a court has ordered a partnership to admit a person as a
member.
Such relief is inconsistent with the fundamental
concept of partnerships as "voluntary" associations with
respect to the relationships among partners. ~ , Crane &
Bromberg, Law of Partnership§ 5, at 38 (1968). Partners stand
as trustees for one another, subject to the highest fiduciary
standard of "utmost good faith, loyalty, integrity, and
fairness in dealings with respect to partnership affairs."
1 Cavitch, Business Organizations§§ 17.01[1], [2] (1985).
By
operation of law, partners face unlimited personal liability
for the acts and omissions of any and all other members
concerning the partnership. ~ , Uniform Partnership Act
§ 15; Tenney v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 409 F. Supp. 746, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). This is a particularly important aspect of
partnerships such as Price Waterhouse, which perform important
"'public watchdog' function[s]" (United States v. Arthur Young
& Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818
(1984)), exposing all partners to
potentially enormous liabilities . See generally Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U . S. 185 (1976).
In short, partnership is a
relationship that courts cannot effectively create by judicial
fiat; Title VII cannot and should not be read as empowering
courts to grant such relief.
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were to be unsuccessful in her lawsuit and then decide to
leave, she would have had a professionally rewarding, well-paid
experience with a prestigious organization from which she might
move with more options than she had when she left with a
pending request for reinstatement.
Continuation of the employment relationship can thus
avoid or at least minimize the problems that might otherwise
exist if the plaintiff prevailed and was entitled to rejoin
Price Waterhouse.ill/

Moreover, maintenance of an ongoing

employment relationship can tend to temper the adverse,
antagonistic nature of the relationship between litigants that
often arises when the plaintiff in a discrimination case is no
longer employed by the defendant.fl§_/
Where a Title VII plaintiff who claims to seek a
position he or she was denied stays on the job there is also a
diminished risk of a disingenuous or insincere request for

35/ Although professing a reluctance to place her career
ambitions "on hold," by resigning plaintiff accomplished just
that as far as her career at Price Waterhouse was concerned.
Her resignation created a complete break in her relationship
with Price Waterhouse and its resources.
She has lost contact
with Price Waterhouse partners and staff, and thus has not had
access to their experience and talents.
She is no longer
familiar with their work, their procedures, or the systems and
projects of their clients.
36/ In Delaware State College v. Ricks, supra, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that a plaintiff should not be
required to resort to administrative remedies while still
employed because it might injure working relationships.
449
U.S. at 255-56.
As noted, a person who files a charge and
remains an employee is protected by law against retaliation.
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reinstatement, made primarily as a legal foundation for seeking
additional damages in the form of front pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

If the prevailing plaintiff has remained on the

job and demonstrated entitlement to be considered for
advancement, there is a lessened risk that a court will have to
address the speculative complexities of such a front pay award.
A requirement that plaintiff stay on the job if given
the opportunity to do so also serves the statutory purpose of
ensuring that plaintiffs mitigate their damages.

Thus, a

plaintiff who stays on the job will only suffer the more
limited damages that might accrue if the court held the
plaintiff entitled to a higher paying position, rather than the
more substantial (but avoidable) loss of the entire salary as
well.

Cf . , ~ , Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, supra, 562

F.2d at 119.

Interim unemployment and underemployment are also

avoided.Ll]_/
Plaintiff suggests that there is unfairness involved
if a person alleging discrimination must "choose between
pursuing a career or seeking complete vindication under the

37/ The fact that a person has a pending request for
reinstatement with a former employer is likely to limit career
opportunities elsewhere.
It is therefore open to question
whether a plaintiff who leaves a defendant's employ to seek
other employment has made effective mitigation efforts if, by
continuing to request reinstatement, the plaintiff has
foreclosed productive alternatives.
It should be noted that,
after resigning, plaintiff did not pursue a career with another
company, but instead set up her own consulting company, in
which she had less diverse projects and fewer available
resources that she had at Price Waterhouse.
(Tr. 118-19.)
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law," and hence that the law should not be construed as
requiring such a choice.
original).

(Pl . Br. 18-19) (emphasis in
by

However, the law has already been construed

the Supreme Court -- as requiring precisely such a choice.

For

example, if a disappointed job applicant sues but has pursued a
career elsewhere, the defendant's later offer of comparable
employment will require a plaintiff to "choose between pursuing
a career" elsewhere and "seeking complete vindication," for the
failure to accept such an offer will cut off the plaintiff's
right to further relief.

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, supra.

In choosing not to stay with Price Waterhouse
plaintiff exercised the right of every Title VII plaintiff (and
indeed every employee) to pursue opportunities elsewhere.
Plaintiff's decision to leave was likely influenced by the
possibility that she would be unsuccessful both in efforts to
become a Price Waterhouse partner and in her lawsuit.

She

might indeed have found a position that she believed superior
to that of a partner at Price Waterhouse.

If so, she would

have suffered no harm by choosing to leave.
Of course, she might not succeed in another venture.
To allow plaintiff to test the waters elsewhere and yet keep
alive a continuing back pay or reinstatement obligation on the
part of Price Waterhouse, without any corresponding benefit to
the firm, would in effect require Price Waterhouse to insure
her against any risk of loss in future endeavors.

Indeed,

under these circumstances a district court would exceed its
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remedia l authorit y in reinstat ing a relation ship that was
severed volunta rily by the plainti ff.

Title VII was intended

to remedy discrim ination, not to provide insuranc e against a
plainti ff's mistake s or bad judgmen t in pursuing career options.
In the final analysis , plainti ff sought to have it
both ways:

she wanted the unlimite d right to pursue her

asserted entitlem ent to a continue d career at Price Waterhou se
despite her volunta ry departu re, and the unencum bered right
followin g such departu re to pursue a career elsewhe re.

Giving

plainti ff that double- barreled career track would disserve
several importa nt public policies and serve none.

Plaintif f

had every right to leave Price Waterho use and pursue her career
elsewhe re, as she volunta rily chose to do.

She did not have

the right to a future free from risk,@ / at the expense of
Price Waterho use.
In conclusi on, the court below correctl y held that
plainti ff was not constru ctively discharg ed, that she
volunta rily resigned , and that her volunta ry termina tion of her
employm ent contrac t with Price Waterho use preclude d her from
any damages or prospec tive relief thereaf ter.

38/ Plainti ff's decision to leave, it should be noted, may be
presumed to have been informed and knowled geable, having come
after she consulte d with counsel about her claims against Price
(Def. Exh. 53.)
Waterho use.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Price Waterhouse
submits that the district court's decision must be reversed.
If on the other hand the decision is not reversed, then the
court's ruling as to plaintiff's remedy must be affirmed.
Date:
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APPENDIX OF
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The following provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2OOOe e t ~ - ,

are

pertinent to the issues raised in the Brief for Appellee Cross Appellant:
42 U.S.C.

§ 2OOOe-2(a)

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his s t atus as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.

,.

42 U.S.C.

§

2OOOe-3(a)

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor
organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter .

.
•

42 U. S.C .

§

2000e-5(g)

If the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for
the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date
more than two years prior to the filing of a
charge with the Commission.
Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable.
No order of the court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individual
as a member of a union, or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment
or advancement or was suspended or discharged for
any reason other than discrimination on account
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this
title.

.
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